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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to excuse for cause three 
potential jurors who voiced a bias in favor of the defendant doctor? 
2. Where plaintiff was told at every juncture by the defendant 
doctor that she was normal and had no heart problem, and reasonably relied on 
the doctor's advice in this regard, was it error for the court to submit the issue 
of comparative negligence to the jury? 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to grant appellant's motions 
for a new trial and for a judgment n.o.v. where there is insufficient evidence as 
a matter of law to allow the issue of plaintiff s comparative negligence to be 
presented to the jury? 
OPINION OF FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
Appellant seeks reversal of the jury verdict finding no cause of 
action entered on March 15, 2000, R. 1051, as well as from an order denying 
plaintiffs motions for a new trial and for j.n.o.v. entered in by the Honorable 
Fred D. Howard, Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, on July 28, 2000, 
Civil No. 970400939. R. 1391. 
/ / 
/ / 
// 
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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). The opinion of the Fourth District Court was filed 
July 28, 2000. R. 1391-90. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal August 23, 
2000. R. 1399. 
CONTROLLING REGULATORY & STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no controlling regulatory or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings. 
On Saturday, January 4, 1997, plaintiff suffered symptoms of 
"unstable angina," a dangerous ischemic heart condition also known as 
"preinfarction angina," which is often a precursor to a heart attack. She reported 
the symptoms to Dr. Bell's staff on January 6, 1997 by telephone. 
R. 1414:78:15-79:9.1 Inexplicably, Dr. Bell's staff scheduled the appointment 
for Monday, January 13, 1997. R. 1414:79:6-20. 
On the January 13,1997 visit, Geri Harding reported to Dr. Bell the 
classic symptomatology of unstable angina. R. 1417:31:16-32; 21; 1414:83:2-
16. Plaintiff contended the standard of care required Dr. Bell to treat this as an 
1
 The clerk inexplicably numbered only the first page of each trial transcript 
volume. Accordingly, for citation purposes, 1414:78:15-20 means Volume 1414 of the 
transcript, page 78 therein, and lines 15-20. 
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"urgent" condition, and (1) either hospitalize Ms. Harding, or (2) medicate her 
with anti-anginal medications, warn her that she is at significant risk for a heart 
attack and refer her immediately to a cardiologist, either that day or the next day, 
for evaluation of coronary artery disease. R. 1415:17:6-25. 
Instead, Dr. Bell referred Ms. Harding for an ETT test, scheduled 
for nine days away (1-22-97). R. 1414:87:2-10. Dr. Bell was not competent to 
read the test independently, but he did so anyway, incorrectly, and reported to 
Ms. Harding that she was normal, and did not have any heart disease. R. 
1414:93:9-20. That ETT test of January 22, 1997 was later "overread" by a 
hospital internist and found to be abnormal, and who reported it to Dr. Bell. R. 
1417:38:16-18 and R. 1413:5:1-15; Trial Exhibit 6, R. 1422. 
An abnormal ETT test is an ominous sign until the matter is 
investigated and resolved by a cardiologist. Accordingly, plaintiff contended 
Dr. Bell was under a duty, once again, to refer Ms. Harding immediately to a 
cardiologist, and to make an appointment for her within a day or two, in addition 
to medicating and warning her of her risk of a heart attack. Instead, his staff 
scheduled the appointment with the cardiologist for two weeks away, or 
February5,1997. R. 1414:95:3-22. Dr. Bell failed to follow up and ensure that 
the immediate appointment had been made. R. 1414:98:23-99:3. His staff left 
a voice mail message on Geri Harding's home telephone routinely informing 
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her of the appointment, but failing to inform her of the meaning of the test 
results or the potentially serious consequences. R. 1414:96:2-23. 
Four days later, on Sunday, January 26, 1997, Ms. Harding was 
cleaning out horse stalls when she began to feel serious anginal pain and other 
cardiac symptoms. R. 1414:99:21-101:11. The pain became exceptionally 
severe and her husband took her to the American Fork Hospital where she was 
given appropriate anginal medication,2 diagnosed with a probable heart attack, 
referred immediately to a cardiologist in Provo, and transported there within a 
few hours. R. 1414:102:17-104:11. 
This matter was tried to a jury on March 7-15, 2000. The jury 
returned a verdict on March 15, 2000, finding defendant 45% negligent and 
plaintiff 55% negligent. The jury was polled and the vote on the verdict was 7-
1. R. 1051-1044.3 The trial court subsequently denied motions for a new trial 
and for judgment n.o.v. R. 1397. A timely notice ofappeal was filed. Plaintiff 
asserts herein error in the failure to excuse jurors for cause and in submitting the 
2
 While at the American Fork Hospital, Dr. Bell happened by (or possibly was 
called by ER personnel) and visited Geri Harding. Ms. Harding and her husband both 
claim to have overheard conversations between Ms. Harding's internist and Dr. Bell 
at the end of her bed where Dr. Bell admitted that he had "dropped the ball" by not 
making an immediate referral to a cardiologist, and following up thereon. R. 
1414:105:9-13. 
3
 The record numbers decrease because the trial clerk Bate-stamped the record 
in reverse order. 
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issue of comparative negligence to the jury. The verdict was therefore contrary 
to law and should be overturned. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts relevant to this appeal are as follows: 
1. Jury Selection: Questionnaires and Voir Dire, Each juror 
filled out a detailed jury questionnaire. R. 1423. The trial court then conducted 
a general voir dire in the courtroom with all the potential jurors, and later 
adjourned to chambers to conduct individual voir dire, with counsel asking some 
questions. R. 1410-1411. As the voir dire for each potential juror was 
concluded, the parties were asked to pass or challenge for cause. The court 
thereupon ruled on the challenges. Three potential jurors were challenged for 
cause by plaintiff due to bias. The challenges were overruled, and plaintiff used 
three peremptory challenges to remove these venire persons from the jury. 
R. 1410:26-7, 1411:12-13, 1411:35-38. 
2. Second Cousin to Key Defense Witness; Close to Witness5 
Mother, Potential Juror No. 11 (Sally Todd) was a 63 year old retired professor 
from BYU. R. 1410:15:5-8. She told the court she personally knew "Kim 
Bateman. Dr. Bateman is my cousin." R. 1410:15:12-13. Dr. Bateman was a 
family physician from Richfield, Utah, and was the only expert witness on the 
standard of care for the defense. R. 1416:4-9. Ms. Todd clarified that she was 
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actually a first cousin to Dr. Bateman's mother, and "I'm very close" to her. R. 
1410:16:19-21; 20:9. She also testified that although she did not know Dr. 
Bateman that well, "I have heard other people make favorable comments about 
him." R. 1410:20:10-12. Because of the favorable comments she had heard, 
"and hearing from his mother," she admitted that she had "a very high opinion 
of him." R. 1410:20:13-17. As a result, she had a bias: 
Q: Would you tend to favor his testimony as opposed to 
somebody who had a different view? 
A: As opposed to an unknown doctor? 
Q: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
A: Maybe. 
R. 1410:20:20-24 (emphasis added). She was then "rehabilitated" with lengthy, 
argumentative questioning by the court. R. 1410:20:25-21:19. Even after the 
court's "rehabilitation," the witness was still unsure about whether she would 
credit Dr. Bateman with more credibility "because of this relationship you have 
with his mother." R. 1410:25:15-17. Ms. Todd said, "I doubt it," which in 
context indicated some uncertainty. Id. This juror was challenged for cause 
(probable bias), the challenge was overruled, and plaintiff used a peremptory 
challenge to strike this potential juror. R. 1410:26-27.4 
We have been unable, as yet, to locate the jury selection sheet wherein the 
parties exercise peremptory challenges. 
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3. Dance Lessons at Dr. BelPs House: School Associations. 
Potential Juror No. 7 (Heather Vance) was a 35-year-old mother from American 
Fork, the community where Dr. Bell lived. R. 1411:6:5-8. She knew Dr. Bell 
and his family because her young daughter had taken dance lessons from Dr. 
Bell's daughter in Dr. BelVs home, as recently as four or five years ago. R. 
1411:4:7-15. When asked about a "social relationship" with Dr. Bell, she noted: 
"I do know his wife. His other daughter, Marissa, is in my daughter's school 
class at Barrett Elementary." R. 1411:4:16-20. She then admitted a bias: 
The Court: In the event you were selected to serve as a 
juror, would that cause you to feel uncomfortable in any way in 
rendering some decisions? 
A: I don't believe so. J don Jt think I could guarantee that. 
The Court: I will make a note of that. 
R. 1411:4:24-5:4 (emphasis added). She later testified in chambers that she 
associated with Dr. Bell's wife in the PTA and at school because their young 
children attended the same school as Dr. Bell's children. R. 1411:6-7. She had 
actually gone on a school-sponsored overnight activity with Dr. Bell's wife and 
their daughters. R. 1411:6:19-24. She then reiterated, when questioned about 
her earlier response on whether she could be fair, "Yea[h], I said I wasn't sure. 
I hoped that I could be." R. 1411:7:4-5. Plaintiff challenged this juror for cause 
(probable bias), the challenge was overruled, and plaintiff used a peremptory 
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challenge to exclude this potential juror from service. R. 1411:12:21 - 13i\isee 
also Footnote 4, supra. 
4. Best Friend was Patient of Dr. Bell. Potential Juror No. 12 
(Marilyn Wursten) was a 52-year-old woman who answered Question No. 26 on 
the Jury Questionnaire (close "acquaintances" who were patients of Dr. Bell), 
as follows: "One of my best friends has been a patient of Dr. Carl Bell." 
R. 1411:29:14-15; R. 1423,No. 12,p.9,Q.26. She stated in open court, "I just 
met Dr. Bell once. He's my best friend's doctor." R. 1411:29:14-15. In 
chambers, she admitted having some prior favorable information on his 
competency based on a conversation with the friend, and "the fact that she just 
said she liked him." R. 1411:32:14-20. She was "rehabilitated" by the court 
and felt that she could be fair. Plaintiff challenged this potential juror for cause 
(probable bias), the challenge was overruled, and plaintiff used a peremptory 
challenge to exclude this potential juror. R. 1411:35:16-38:5; see also Footnote 
4, supra. 
5. Alleged Comparative Negligence of Plaintiff. Defendant 
argued several key points to try to establish contributory negligence by plaintiff. 
These points were as follows: 
a. The 1985 ETT. In 1985, while under Dr. Bell's 
treatment, the records show that plaintiff had some type of chest pain for which 
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she visited Dr. Bell. R. 1414:117:1046; Trial Ex. A, pp. 1-3. This was 12 
years before the events at issue in this case. The Record reflects that Dr. Bell 
did an EKG and recommended an ETT. R. 1414:118:6-8. The Record is silent 
as to whether or not plaintiff actually had the ETT (neither party could 
remember) and there was no indication of the test results. Defendant argued that 
this constituted contributory negligence by plaintiff. R. 1418:37:9-20. 
b. Smoking. Plaintiff smoked prior to her heart attack 
and the defense claimed this was comparative negligence. R. 1412:17:12-16. 
c. The Truck Stop. On or about Saturday, January 4, 
1997, plaintiff sustained a severe attack of chest pain at a truck stop, which 
included chest pain, nausea, numbness in the shoulder, etc. The symptoms 
lasted 30-60 minutes. R. 1414:70:10-75:18. See Trial Ex. 2, Addendum l.5 
Plaintiff did not go to the hospital, but called Dr. Bell's office the following 
Monday to schedule an appointment. Defendant argued that it constituted 
comparative negligence by plaintiff in failing to seek medical help the same day 
itoccurred. R. 1418:39:7-40:10. 
d. Pain Two Days Before Heart Attack. Plaintiff 
allegedly had some chest discomfort two days before the heart attack on 1/26/97. 
5
 Trial Exhibit 2 is a typed translation of Dr. Bell's hand-written chart note (Trial 
Exhibit 1). 
-9-
This was reported only in Dr. Smith's records, taken a day after the heart attack. 
Trial Ex. 13, % 3, R. 1422. Defendant argued it was comparative negligence not 
to seek medical help right away. R. 1412:11-12; 1415:66:18-68:10. 
6. Multiple Objections to Contributory Negligence in This 
Case, Plaintiff made multiple objections to plaintiffs alleged contributory 
negligence in this case. First, plaintiff set forth in the Trial Brief an objection 
to considering plaintiffs smoking as comparative negligence. R. 953-952. A 
case was cited by plaintiff in this argument that any comparative negligence by 
plaintiff "must be contemporaneous with the malpractice of the physician.55 
R. 953 (citations omitted). Second, plaintiff made a motion for a directed 
verdict at the close of her evidence, urging the court to rule as a matter of law 
that plaintiff had no comparative negligence. Testimony, March 15,2000, p. 6; 
R. 1048. Third, plaintiffs counsel argued strongly in chambers at the time of 
arguing the jury instructions that there was no comparative negligence, 
requesting that the court omit comparative negligence questions. R. 1048. 
Fourth, on the occasion of objections to jury instructions, plaintiffs counsel 
argued that there was no comparative negligence and that the matter should not 
be submitted to the jury, and objected to the various instructions that submitted 
the matter to the jury. 
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7. No Warning of Danger on 1/13/97. Ms. Harding gave 
uncontradicted, unchallenged testimony that, in the visit to Dr. Bell on 1/13/97, 
she was told she was normal and was not warned in any way that she was at risk 
for a heart attack. R. 1414:88:14-25. Her testimony was: 
Q. Okay. Now, explain everything ~ or tell the jury 
everything that you can recall Dr. Bell telling you. 
A. Okay. I told him my symptoms and he said we 're going 
to do an EKG, and then he just left the room. 
• • • 
A. And then the [EKG] paper came out and then she [the 
technician] left and then he came — then Dr. Bell came back in and 
he said Vm so relieved. He said everything looks great. 
Everything looks just fine. And I said to him, I says, well, then it 
wasn't a heart attack. If it wasn't a heart attack, let's find out what 
it was because it hurt. 
• • • 
A. . . . He had a big smile on his face and he said, oh, I'm 
must so relieved. Yeah. 
• • • 
A. So he says, I'll — let's see. He says / will have them 
make the appointment in the morning, one of the girls make the 
appointment in the morning and then I'll call you and let you know 
when it is, and I said okay. 
• • • 
Q. Did you care when the appointment was made? 
A. I didn't care at all because I thought I was fine. I felt 
fine. He told me — I didn't think — I didn't know what an EKG 
was and I thought that showed if you had — if you had a heart 
attack it would show up, but he said there was nothing on there 
so I thought, well, it's not my heart, but we'll go do this treadmill, 
you know. 
• • • 
Q. Did Dr. Bell on that occasion tell you anything to the 
effect, Mrs. Harding, this is an urgent condition, on the 13th? 
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A. No. 
Q. Did he tell you anything to the effect that you have what 
may be a precursor to a heart attack? 
A. No. He told me I was fine. 
Q. Did he tell you anything to the effect that I cannot tell 
without further testing by a specialist? 
A. He said I want to do a treadmill test. 
Q. Did he warn you not to do anything that would exert 
yourself? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he say anything to the effect you must see a 
cardiologist immediately? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he give you any medication? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he say go get some medication? 
A. No. 
Q. Did he say take aspirin? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, did he say anything to the effect that it would be 
a good idea for you to check into a hospital and have yourself 
tested thoroughly? 
A. No. 
R. 1414:84:17-18; 84:21-22; 85:13-18; 85:25-86:1; 86:22-25; 87:11-17; 88:10-
89:10 (emphasis added). Dr. Bell had no memory whatsoever of anything "that 
was said at the meeting with Geri Harding other than what is in the record." 
R. 1417:20:1-6 ("that's true"). Trial Ex. 2, the chart note of the 1/13/97 visit, 
reflects no such warning or anything else of concern. See Addendum 1, copy of 
Trial Ex. 2, R. 1422. Defense counsel did not even delve into the issue of what 
Dr. Bell had told Mrs. Harding on cross-examination! R. 1414:114 - 129. 
Therefore, Mrs. Harding's testimony went in on these points without challenge. 
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8. No Warning of Danger on 1/22/97, On 1/22/97, at the time 
of the ETT, plaintiff gave uncontradicted testimony that Dr. Bell told her it was 
"normal." R. 1414:93:9-15. Geri Harding testified: 
Q. Now, tell us what Dr. Bell told you about the test results, 
the ETT test results. 
A. I remember one thing he said. He said, do you want to 
go on — 
Q. This is while you're on the machine still? 
A. While I was on the machine. 
Q. He said --
A. He said you've gone as far as you need to go, do you 
want to go on? I said it so hot in here, if I don't need to go on, I 
don't want to go on and he said okay. He says, are you okay, and 
I said I'm fine, but it's just so hot in here, and if I don't have to do 
it any longer, I don't want to. And then he says, well, everything 
looks fine. Everything looks normal and I said okay. So I went 
out and --
Q. Did he say there was any abnormality of the test at all? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. He said — normal was his words? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. What did you do? 
A. I went out and Mark with sitting in the truck and I just 
said, well, I'm fine. You got me for another 30 years. 
Q. Those were actually your words? 
A. Yeah. And we laughed about that. 
R. 1414:93:2-25 (emphasis added). As Geri Harding drove off that day she was 
relieved that she was "normal," and was not given any type of warning or 
medication: 
Q. Okay. How did you feel as you drove off that day having 
received this joyful news? 
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A. I felt real relieved and I felt that whole time — I just 
thought it was like a one time occurrence thing. I didn't — 
Q. On that day, did Dr. Bell give you any kind of warning 
at all? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. Any kind of medication? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. Okay. Did he give you any sense to think that you were 
at any kind of risk whatsoever? 
A. No. He told me everything was normal. 
R. 1414:94:1-13 (emphasis added). Dr. Bell did not dispute this, basically 
claiming that he did not remember what he had told Ms. Harding. R. 
1417:22:24-23:6. It is "possible you told her that it was normal." Ans. "It's 
possible." R.1417:23:5-6. Defense counsel did not even address this matter 
on cross-examination! R. 1414:114 - 129. As a result, Mrs. Harding's 
testimony was again unchallenged on this issue. 
9. Non-Emergency Appointment with Cardiologist Was 
Scheduled by Dr. Bell Two Weeks after Abnormal ETT, Geri Harding 
testified without contradiction that she learned of the ETT test result and the 
appointment with the cardiologist when she received a routine telephone voice 
mail message on her answering machine. The colloquy was as follows: 
Q. Now, what is the next time [you had] . . . any contact 
with his staff[?] 
• • • 
A. There was a message on my answering machine and it 
said — 
-14-
Q. From whom? 
A. From Dr. Bell's office. It was a lady, and I don't know 
what she said other than we've made an appointment with Dr. 
Asayfor February 5th because we have found — and the words 
were real big and I didn't know what they were. 
• • • 
Q. The phone message, did the phone message give you any 
cmsefor any kind of concern or urgency? 
A. No. 
Q. Did it say anything to the effect you have to — you 
should do no exertion, anything like that? 
A. It just said we found some — something. I don't know 
what they said. 
Q. All right. 
A. And we have made you an appointment with Dr. Asay. 
Q. Nothing else? 
A. Then it said something else, but I don't know — I didn't 
even — I didn't know then, I don't know now. I don't know what 
the words were. 
Q. But was there any warning to you that you shouldn't do 
something? 
A. No. I didn't know who Dr. Asay was. 
Q. Was there any indication that you should take any 
medication? 
A. None. 
Q. Okay. Did they say call our office immediately, it's 
important, anything like that? 
A. No. 
R. 1414:95:3-5; 95:12-18; 96:2-23 (bracketed portions added for clarity). Geri 
Harding had no input on the scheduling of the appointment with the 
cardiologist, Dr. Asay. She testified: 
Q. Let's see. Anything else in that telephone call [with Dr. 
Bell's staff] that you can recall? 
A. No. 
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Q. Now, when you talked — well, when you got the phone 
message the day before — 
A. I called the same day. 
Q. Okay. So on the same day. Was the appointment already 
made for you? 
A. Yes. We made an appointment with Dr. Asay on 
February 5th. 
Q. Did you have any input whatsoever, any input into the 
date of that appointment? 
A. No. It was already made when they called. 
R. 1414:98:2-14 (bracketed portion added for clarity). 
10. Dr. Bell's Admission of Importance of Quick Appoint-
ment with Cardiologist, Dr. Bell's deposition testimony was read to the jury, 
which contained the admission that it was important to make an expeditious 
appointment with the cardiologist. The testimony was as follows: 
Q. Next question: "But set an appointment for when and 
when would you do that?" 
Now, read your answer to the jury, please? 
A. "I think there is some sense that you would like to have 
this done expeditiously. Urgently, immediately, I'm not sure I 
could use those terms, but it's something -- I think it's inherent in 
the diagnosis. If you've got a positive treadmill test, you want the 
cardiologist to see the patient." 
Q. Next question was: "How soon do you want him to see 
the patient?" 
Read the jury your answer. 
A. "The day before you did it." 
R. 1417:26:19 - 27:6 (emphasis added).6 
6
 Dr. Bell also claimed, contrary to his testimony, that it was not urgent to make 
an expeditious appointment with a cardiologist. R. 1417:25:19 - 24. Later, again, he 
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11. No Indication of Warning or Danger in Medical Chart or 
ETT. The ETT report (Trial Ex. 6) contains no indication of a warning to Geri 
Harding that she was somehow in danger or at risk for a heart attack. There is 
otherwise no indication of a warning given to her on January 22 or January 23, 
1997. See Trial Ex. 2, R. 1422, Addendum 1. 
12. Geri Harding Had Preinfarction Angina. Dr. Bell agreed 
that the description of symptoms given by Ms. Harding, as recorded in his chart 
note of 1/13/97, is a description of angina (cardiac heart pain) at rest, which is 
the most serious form of unstable or preinfarction angina. R. 1417:30:4-19.7 
Later, again, he admitted that Ms. Harding's 1/13/97 chart note symptoms are 
consistent with preinfarction angina. Id. at 3 3:16-21. Unstable or preinfarction 
angina may also occur if the attack is "new onset," or having just recently 
started. R. 1413:22:9-15; 35:8-15. 
13. No Warning of Danger on 1/23/97. or Thereafter. Shortly 
after the ETT of 1122191, Geri Harding received a telephone call from Dr. Bell's 
office, leaving a message on her voice mail and a date for an appointment with 
admitted that Ms. Harding's 1/13/97 chart note symptoms are consistent with 
preinfarction angina. Id. at 33:16-21. 
7
 He was then read several lines from his deposition, where he indicated, "She 
had symptoms suggestive of preinfarction angina." Id. at 31:16 - 23. He then claimed 
that this did not refresh his recollection, "but that is apparently what I said. J don H 
agree with it, but it is what I said." R. 1417:31:24 - 32:2 (emphasis added). 
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a cardiologist for 2/5/97. R. 1414:95:9-18. She got the call on about 1/23/97, 
and called Dr. Bell's office to find out what was going on. R. 1414:95:23-24. 
She was told by a staff member that Dr. Bell wanted to have her checked by a 
cardiologist, but there was no indication that this was a rush, or an emergency, 
or that Geri Harding was at any particular risk. R. 1414:96:2-20. This is borne 
out by the Bell office chart, Trial Exhibit 2, and the uncontested, unchallenged 
testimony of Geraldine Harding. R. 1414:86:22 - 87:17. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
- Failure to Excuse Certain Jurors for Cause (Bias) -
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO FAIL TO EXCUSE THREE POTENTIAL JURORS FOR 
CAUSE DUE TO BIAS. 
A. The Law of Excusing Jurors for Cause. 
Selecting an unbiased jury is critical for a fair trial. The Court of 
Appeals has held that voir dire questions must be allowed " . . . so as to allow 
counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges." Davis v. Grand 
County Service Area, dba Allen Memorial Hospital, 905 P.2d 988, 993 (Utah 
1995). The Court observed that "the course of jury voir dire is largely the 
attorneys5 obligation." Id. For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court has firmly 
held that trial courts must excuse jurors for cause when cause exists. Crawford 
v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994), and State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 
629, 649 (Utah 1995). Although since 1995, it is not automatically reversible 
error in a criminal case to refuse to excuse a juror for cause who should be 
excused, it is nonetheless an important factor in determining whether the 
plaintiff had a fair trial. In Carter, a capital case, the Supreme Court took the 
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opportunity to lecture trial courts about failures to excuse for cause. This advice 
is apropos for Harding, though a civil case: 
[W]e take this opportunity to address an issue of growing concern 
to this court. We are perplexed by the trial courts' frequent 
insistence on passing jurors for cause in death penalty cases when 
legitimate concerns about their suitability have been raised during 
voir dire. While the abuse-of-discretion standard of review affords 
trial courts wide latitude in making their for-cause determinations, 
we are troubled by their tendency to "push the edge of the 
envelope. . . ." If a party raises legitimate questions as to a 
potential juror's beliefs, biases, or physical ability to serve, the 
potential juror should be struck for cause, even where it would 
not be legally erroneous to refuse. 
Carter, 888 P.2d at 649-50 (emphasis added). The Carter logic and philosophy 
has applicability in civil cases as well. The Advisory Committee note to the 
proposed changes to Rule 47, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
Paragraph (f)(6). The Utah Supreme Court has noted a tendency of 
trial court judges to rule against a challenge for cause in the face of 
legitimate questions about a juror's biases. The Supreme Court 
limited the following admonition to capital cases, but it is a sound 
philosophy even in trials of lesser consequence [quoting the 
above-referenced excerpt from Carter, 888 P.2d at 649-50]. 
• • • 
In determining challenges for cause, the task of the judge is to find 
the proper balance. It is not the judge's duty to seat a jury from a 
too-small venire panel or to seat a jury as quickly as possible. 
Although thorough questioning of a juror to determine the 
existence, nature and extent of a bias is appropriate, it is not the 
judge's duty to extract the "right" answer from or to 
"rehabilitate" a juror. The judge should accept honest answers to 
understood questions and, based on that evidence, make the 
sometimes difficult decision to seat only those jurors the judge is 
convinced will act fairly and impartially. 
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• • • 
The objective of a challenge for cause is to remove from the venire 
panel persons who cannot act impartially in deliberating upon a 
verdict. The lack of impartiality may be due to some bias for or 
against one of the parties; it may be due to an opinion about the 
subject matter of the action or about the action itself. The civil 
rules of procedure have a few - and the criminal rules many more -
specific circumstances, usually a relationship with a party or a 
circumstance of the juror, from which the bias of the juror is 
inferred. 
• • • 
The amendments focus on the state of mind clause. In determining 
whether a person can act impartially, the court should focus not 
only on that person's state of mind but should consider the totality 
of the circumstances. These circumstances might include the 
experiences, conduct, statements, opinions, or associations of the 
juror. Rather than determining that the juror is "prevented" from 
acting impartially, the court should determine whether the juror is 
not likely to act impartially. These amendments conform to the 
directive of the Supreme Court: If there is a legitimate question 
about the ability of a person to act impartially, the court should 
remove that person from the panel. 
This new standard for challenges for cause represents a balance 
more easily stated than achieved. These amendments encourage 
judges to exercise greater care in evaluating challenges for cause 
and to resolve legitimate doubts in favor of removal. This may 
mean some jurors now removed by peremptory challenge will be 
removed instead for cause. It may also mean the court will have to 
summon more prospective jurors for voir dire. Whether lawyers 
will use fewer peremptory challenges will have to await the 
judgment of experience. 
Proposed changes to Rule 47, Advisory Committee Note (emphasis added). 
Ms. Harding sustained an unnecessary heart attack due to Dr. Bell's 
negligence. This trial is her only opportunity to get compensation. It was 
-21-
crucial that she get a fair jury. Harding "raise[d] legitimate questions as to a 
potential juror's beliefs [and] biases," and these three "potential juror[s] should 
be struck for cause." Carter, 888 P.2d at 650. There were plenty of other jurors 
in the pool to fill out the required eight jurors. 
B. Excusing The Three Challenged Jurors for Potential Bias. 
Failure to excuse a juror for cause in a medical malpractice case, 
when cause exists, which forces the plaintiff to use a peremptory challenge to 
strike that juror, is reversible error. Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533 (Utah 
1981). Jenkins was recently cited with approval in the Utah Court Rules, 
Annotated, Lexis Publishing, 2000, p. 137, and by the Utah Supreme Court. See 
State v. Saunders, 992 P.2d 951, 965 (Utah 1999) (Saunders II). 
The law of Saunders II is instructive for the Court in the case sub 
judice. This was a child sexual abuse case, and the defendant argued for 
reversible error based upon the failure to remove one juror for cause. In 
response to the question about whether she could be fair and impartial in 
deciding the case, the juror stated, "It wouldn't prevent me. It might make me 
uncomfortable. " This is hauntingly similar to the expressions of doubt about 
being fair by Jurors 11 and 7 in this case. See Facts 2 and 3. The trial court 
apparently then "rehabilitated" the juror and refused to excuse her for cause, 
which resulted in a peremptory challenge being used. The Court of Appeals 
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upheld a verdict against the defendant on the basis that the defendant would 
have to show that the failure to remove that juror "actually prejudiced his case." 
State v. Saunders, 893 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App. 1995). The Supreme Court 
reversed, first addressing whether the juror should have been dismissed for 
cause, and then whether the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court observed, 
as to "cause": 
What is important is that she stated that her prior experience 
would make her uncomfortable in deciding this case. We 
certainly do not impugn her honesty and integrity when we refuse 
to take her answer to be dispositive of her qualification to sit. . . . 
What is important is that despite her sincere commitment to be fair, 
it was clearly possible that her personal traumatic experience 
might affect her neutrality in some way because, as she stated, 
making a decision would make her "uncomfortable" for reasons 
that went beyond the discomfort that many jurors experience when 
rendering judgment. 
Saunders II 992 P.2d at 964 (emphasis added). This "uncomfortable" feeling 
is comparable to what Jurors 11 and 7 stated, i.e. they did not know if they could 
be fair or impartial for personal reasons. Juror No.l 1 (Sally Todd) was "very 
close" to Dr. Bateman's mother, her first cousin, and heard lots of good things 
about him (probably from his mother), so she "maybe" would favor his 
testimony over that of an unknown doctor, and expressed doubt as to whether 
she could be fair. See Fact 2. Only after a Softball "rehabilitation" by the court 
did she claim that she could be fair. Virtually any reasonably intelligent citizen, 
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no matter how biased, can be "rehabilitated" if badgered into saying he/she 
"could really be fair." That is in effect what the trial court did to rehabilitate 
Sally Todd. 
The discomfort of the challenged juror in Saunders II is also 
comparable to Juror 7's situation because of her personal association with Dr. 
Bell. This caused No. 7 to frankly and publicly express doubt as to whether she 
could be fair. This language of Saunders II could apply equally to this case: 
Given her prior experiences, and absent any further explanation of 
her attitude, this juror should have been removed. We emphasize, 
again[,] that trial judges should err on the side of caution in 
ruling on for-cause challenges and that the scope of judicial 
discretion accorded the trial judge must be evaluated in light of the 
ease with which all issues of bias can be dispensed by the simple 
expedient of replacing a questionable juror with another whose 
neutrality is not open to question. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 
533, 536 (Utah 1981). 
Saunders II, 992 P.2d at 965 (emphasis added, citation in original). 
The prosecution in Saunders cited Menzies for the proposition that 
it was not reversible error to fail to remove the juror for bias because "actual 
prejudice had to be shown." Saunders, 992 P.2d at 965. The court then 
observed that while Menzies had abandoned the mechanical rule, the loss of a 
peremptory challenge may still be reversible error: 
Menzies did not foreclose all consideration of erroneous for-cause 
rulings in determining whether there is sufficient prejudice in the 
circumstances of the case to require a reversal. . . . Menzies held 
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that the defendant had to demonstrate prejudice To that end, 
we will take into account on a cumulative basis all erroneous 
rulings with respect to rulings on voir dire and for-cause 
challenges for the purposes of determining whether there is 
reversible error. In our view, the trial court's undue limitations on 
voir dire questions and the trial court's refusal to strike Juror 
Henline are sufficiently cumulative to raise a reasonable question 
as to the neutrality of the jury and to constitute reversible error. 
Id. at 965 (emphasis added). Prejudice is determined by the cumulative effect 
of the rulings. Here, we have the cumulative effect of failing to dismiss three 
biased jurors for cause. This was a close case, with a 45% negligence finding 
against the doctor, and 55% against plaintiff, on a 7-1 jury vote. A six percent 
(6%) shift in liability would have changed the outcome. Obviously, using all 
three peremptories to strike jurors who should have been stricken for bias was 
prejudicial to plaintiff. 
C. Prejudice Demonstrated, 
This particular venire was very "conservative," perhaps more so 
than any other counsel has seen in 27 years of personal injury litigation. There 
were numerous individuals on this panel who believed it was inappropriate to 
award pain and suffering damages and who believed that there should be 
significant limits on medical malpractice litigation, among other things. See, for 
example, Juror No. 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 16, 19, 21, 22 and 25 Jury Questionnaires, 
Questions 3,4, 5, 6 and 7, Addendum 2, R. 1423. Given the very conservative 
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nature of this panel, peremptory challenges were extremely important to try to 
give the panel balance. 
Juror No. 12's best friend was Dr. Bell's patient. Fact 4. But for 
wasting the peremptory challenges on this juror, who should have been struck 
for cause, the first juror plaintiff would have struck would have been Juror No. 
2 (Mrs. Sanft), who ended up being the foreperson. See Affidavit, R. 1207-
1204. Juror No. 28 wrote in answer to Question No. 4: "There should always 
be limits [on monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice]. Sometimes 
monetary rewards are too outrageous - unless the damage is severe enough to 
warrant the compensation." She also stated that people "sue too much," and that 
"almost all doctors try to do their best although mistakes are made." See Juror 
2 Questionnaire, Question 6, Addendum 2 herein; R. 1423, No. 2. That juror 
surely exhibited an undesirable attitude for a plaintiff in a medical malpractice 
case. 
Failure to remove Juror No. 7 (daughter had dance lessons at Dr. 
Bell's home) for cause robbed plaintiff of the opportunity to strike another 
individual who could otherwise be removed to make this jury more fair. For 
example, our second peremptory challenge would have been Juror No. 1, a 
Note: this juror was both No. 2 in the venire and No. 2 in the jurors ultimately 
selected. 
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healthy young man of 22 years of age without much experience in life, who felt 
that verdicts were too high and who said he would have trouble awarding a 
judgment against a doctor. R. 1294-1291. He thought there should be limits on 
the right to sue for malpractice damages and would have trouble awarding 
substantial damages. R. 1423, No. 1, Qs. 4, 5. 
Had the challenged three been excused for cause, plaintiff could 
have stricken three of the less favorable potential jurors remaining in the pool, 
thus ensuring a fair trial. As it was, at least six members of the jury panel had 
strong views in favor of limitations on medical malpractice cases, and pain and 
suffering in particular. See Questionnaires of some of the serving jurors, Nos. 
1, 2, 4, 14, 15, 16, 22 and 25 (particularly 2, 16, 22 and 25), R. 1423, 
Addendum 2. The panel was tilted from the outset. 
The remaining potential jurors would have balanced out this panel 
considerably. For example, No. 26, Bill Johnson, was a blue-collar worker 
whose wife had experienced poor medical care in the past. R. 1423, No. 26. His 
answers indicated that he was fair and unbiased and we would have been 
delighted to have him serve as a juror (he was the first alternate stricken by the 
defendant). Also, Juror No. 29, the alternate, was apparently the only juror who 
had been a smoker like the plaintiff. R. 1423, No. 29. She served only as an 
alternate and was excused for the deliberations, but would have been a very fair 
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juror for the plaintiff. Juror No. 32 was a housewife and retired secretary, who 
stated that people should be held "accountable for their actions." See answers 
to Questions 6 and 7, R. 1423, No. 32. She apparently would have been a very 
fair juror for the plaintiff. 
Juror No. 33 was a blue-collar electrician whose Questionnaire 
revealed that he had no strong biases, one way or the other. R. 1423, No. 32. 
Juror No. 34 was a retired blue-collar worker who had operated a crane and a 
loader. R. 1423, No. 34. In answer to Question No. 7 he wrote, "You pay 
doctors to be right." Id. It is obvious that he had no strong biases in favor of the 
defendant and would have been a fair juror. Juror No. 35 was also a blue-collar 
worker and the wife of a blue-collar worker. R. 1423, No. 35. She wrote, in 
answer to Question No. 11, that her husband's high blood pressure was not 
treated thoroughly and he might still be alive if the doctor had followed up 
better. Id. Obviously, she would have been a fair juror for the plaintiff. 
Because the court failed to excuse the three challenged jurors for 
cause, plaintiff used her peremptory challenges, and thus was prevented from 
striking three others with strong "conservative" biases. Had the three 
challenged jurors been appropriately stricken for cause, plaintiffs peremptory 
strikes would have made this panel more fair. As a result, Geraldine Harding 
did not get a fair trial and this Court should grant her a new trial. 
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POINT II 
- No Comparative Negligence as a Matter of Law -
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A MATTER 
OF LAW TO ALLOW PLAINTIFF'S COMPARATIVE 
NEGLIGENCE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE JURY. 
A. Legal Standards in Granting a New Trial Based on 
Insufficiency of the Evidence. 
Rule 59(6), U.R.C.P., provides for a new trial where the evidence 
is insufficient "to justify the verdict," or where the verdict "is against law." 
Rule 56(7) provides for a new trial where there is an "error in law." The verdict 
will be reversed if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
who prevailed, the court concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). The court must 
accord every reasonable inference fairly drawn from it in a light favorable to the 
jury's verdict. Beats v. Commercial Sec, Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 
1987), cert. den. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). The decision of the trial court to 
grant or deny a motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal when the 
record contains substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict 
in favor of the moving party. The evidence must be sufficient in amount and 
credibility that, when considered in connection with the other evidence and 
circumstances shown in the case, it would justify some, but not necessarily all, 
-29-
reasonable minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be the truth. Price-Orem 
Inv. Co. v. Rawlins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1996). On the 
other hand, if the trial court can reasonably conclude that there was insufficient 
evidence to justify the verdict, or it is manifestly against the weight of the 
evidence in violation of Rule (a)(6), or that the jury acted with passion and 
prejudice and contrary to other rules, it may grant the motion and order a new 
trial. Crookson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
B. Evidence Marshaled in Favor of the Verdict. 
There were very limited opportunities for plaintiff Geri Harding to 
have been negligent in this case because she had only three contacts with Dr. 
Bell's office in a ten-day period. However, defense counsel elicited testimony 
that in November, 1985, twelve years before this incident with Dr. Bell, plaintiff 
had visited Dr. Bell "complaining of left side pain, no energy, under stress." R. 
1414:117:13-14; Fact 5(a). She also admitted that in 1984, Dr. Bell told her to 
quit smoking. R. 1414:118 - 122; Fact 5(b). However, as noted below, 
negligent acts of a plaintiff in causing or contributing to a situation which causes 
the plaintiff to hire a professional may not be considered or counted as 
comparative negligence. See Point II.C below. Therefore, any facts or 
conditions which preceded the events leading to the heart attack will not be 
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marshaled. The seeds of comparative negligence, if any, must be found in these 
three contacts with Dr. Bell's office between January 13th and 23rd. 
What happened in those contacts is uncontested. Plaintiff testified 
she was always told by Dr. Bell there was nothing wrong with her and that her 
heart was fine and "normal." Facts 7, 8, 9, 11. Dr. Bell did not dispute making 
the statements attributed to him by Ms. Harding. Id. Therefore, Geri Harding's 
testimony was uncontested. The visit of 1/13/97 is a good example. Ms. 
Harding testified, without any hostile cross-examination whatsoever and 
therefore without contradiction, that Dr. Bell flat-out told her that "everything 
looks fine" with her heart and that there was nothing wrong with her. See 
Fact 7. She provided detailed accounts of what Dr. Bell said, quoting him. Id. 
No warnings were given Geri Harding that she was somehow at risk because of 
her heart. Id. Dr. Bell claimed absolutely no memory of what was said, but did 
not dispute Geri Harding's account. Id. His chart note of the 1/13/97 visit 
supports Ms. Harding's version, and reflects no warnings or areas of concern. 
Id. Plaintiffs EKG was in fact normal, so it was very consistent that Dr. Bell 
would tell Geri Harding on that occasion that there was nothing wrong with her 
heart. R. 1414:85-6. Therefore, no information was imparted to Geri Harding 
on the 1/13/97 contact that could possibly form the basis of comparative 
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negligence. Defense counsel did not even cross-examine on this issue. R. 
1414:114-131. 
The next contact Geraldine Harding had was the visit of 1/22/97 
when the exercise treadmill test was done. Plaintiff provided uncontradicted 
testimony that Dr. Bell told her the test was "normal," and gave her absolutely 
no cause to be concerned about anything. Fact 8. Accordingly, nothing in this 
contact could reasonably provide the basis of negligence for Geri Harding. 
Again, there was no cross-examination of Geri Harding on this issue. R. 
1414:114-131. 
Geri Harding's next contact with Dr. Bell's office occurred when 
she listened to a call on her answering machine that referenced an appointment 
having been made with one Dr. Asay. Fact 9. However, once again Geri 
Harding provided uncontradicted testimony that she was told only that they had 
"found something" and that Dr. Bell wanted her to see Dr. Asay, whom she did 
not know, and that Dr. Bell's office set the appointment for February 5th, 
approximately two weeks away. Facts 9,10. There was no warning or urgency. 
Id. It is uncontested that Geri Harding was given no information by Dr. Bell's 
staff to alert her that she was somehow at risk for a cardiac event. At every 
juncture, thus far, she was told that she was normal and that there was nothing 
wrong with her heart. 
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This brings us to the next three days, January 24, 25 and 26. Dr. 
Smith, Dr. Asay's partner, took on the case on Sunday, January 26th, the day of 
the heart attack. R. 1422, Ex. 13; 1415:7-10. As claimed in Dr. Smith's chart 
note of 1/27/97, Geri Harding was feeling chest discomfort for two days prior 
to the heart attack. Defendant argues from this information that Geri Harding 
must have ignored the warning signs of a heart attack and thus should be held 
comparatively negligent for her heart attack. This Court will see that as a matter 
of law, plaintiff could not be said to have ignored a cardiac condition under 
these facts, and thus could not have been contributorily negligent. See Point 
II.E, infra. 
C. Events Prior to Coming to See a Professional May Not be Considered 
as the Basis for Comparative Negligence or Causation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has squarely and recently held that the 
negligent acts of a plaintiff in causing or contributing to the situation that 
plaintiff hired a professional to resolve cannot be the basis of a comparative 
negligence defense and cannot be considered in determining causation or 
damages. Steiner Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 996 P.2d 531,2000 Utah LEXIS 
23 (Utah 2000). The plaintiff in Steiner hired the Johnson & Higgins 
accounting firm to perform various professional accounting services with 
respect to its retirement plan. Johnson & Higgins committed professional 
malpractice which resulted in unintended and unwarranted taxation. Johnson 
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& Higgins maintained at trial that Steiner was contributorily negligent in 
creating the benefit plan prior to consulting it, by failing to consult a lawyer 
regarding the plan, and failing to act even when it had knowledge that the plan 
was problematic. Id. at f 2. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that plaintiffs cannot be 
contributorily negligent "unless their negligence is causally connected to their 
injury." Id. at | 4, citing Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P.2d 728, 730 (Utah 
1984). The Steiner court notes that "injury" is defined as something done 
against the right of a party, producing damage. Id. The court then observes: 
Thus, a client may be injured if a professional fails to fulfill his 
responsibilities to him. For a client to be contributorily negligent, 
his negligence must relate or contribute to the alleged injury 
caused by the professional stemming from the professional 
relationship. . . . When applying these principles to professional 
negligence, other courts have barred contributory negligence 
defenses based upon the plaintiffs actions taken before obtaining 
the services of a professional. The defenses have been barred 
regarding medical, legal and accounting services. 
Id. at fflf 4, 5 (emphasis added). The court observes that the proper focus is "the 
injury for which relief was sought in the case rather than on the condition for 
which the plaintiff sought professional help." Id. at \ 6. 
Likewise, just as events that occur prior to seeking professional 
help cannot be considered for negligence, they can also not be considered as a 
proximate or direct cause. Steiner observed: 
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In applying this reasoning, we conclude that a preexisting 
condition that a professional is called upon to resolve cannot be 
the cause, either proximate or direct, of the professional's failure 
to exercise an appropriate standard of care in fulfilling his duties. 
To decide otherwise would allow professionals to avoid 
responsibility for the very duties they undertake to perform. . . . 
A doctor, for example, might be able to avoid liability for 
negligently treating an injured person because the patient 
negligently had run a traffic light and was injured. Such a result 
would clearly be unsound. 
Id. at % 7 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the jury in this case should never have 
been allowed to consider any factor for either negligence or causation which 
preexisted the January 13, 1997 visit to Dr. Bell. This includes the alleged 
failure to follow up in 1985 with an ETT, a history of smoking, and allegedly 
failing to go to a doctor right away on January 4, 1997, after the truck stop 
incident. See Fact 5. The condition for which plaintiff sought Dr. Bell's help 
was a possible heart condition. It did not matter whether plaintiffs condition 
was caused by her own smoking, or failure to seek medical help right away after 
the truck stop incident. 
"[A] plaintiffs negligence in injuring himself could not be 
contributory negligence because it was not' simultaneous [ ] with or cooperating 
with' the fault for which plaintiff sought recovery." Id. at |^ 6 (citations 
omitted). In order for something plaintiff did to be a contributing or 
comparative cause, it would have to be coincidental and simultaneous with Dr. 
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Bell's failure to recognize the condition of unstable angina, or Bell's failure to 
warn or medicate plaintiff. It was Dr. Bell's duty to treat Geri Harding's 
dangerous condition, the possibly unstable angina, and to grant him comparative 
negligence based on the condition she walked in the door with would simply 
allow him to avoid responsibility for the very duty he undertakes to perform for 
her. Treatment for conditions that exist are why patients go to doctors in the 
first place. Plaintiff made early objections to the consideration of Geri 
Harding's pre-existing conditions. Fact 6. 
A plaintiffs negligent acts can only be considered as causing or 
contributing to causation and damages where that negligence is causally 
connected to the "injury." Id. at ff 12,13 (citing Acculog with approval; Id. at 
ffif 13, 4). In Acculog, an automobile dealership was hired to do repairs on an 
expensive vehicle containing geological equipment that was to be used in the 
field. A fire developed due to defendant's negligence, which destroyed some 
valuable equipment. Defendant claimed contributory negligence because 
plaintiff did not have a fire extinguisher on hand, which could have extinguished 
the fire and minimized the damage. The court held that the presence or absence 
of a fire extinguisher could not, under any circumstances, be comparative 
negligence, even though it may have actually been negligent not to have it. The 
court stated: 
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Testimony at the trial made it clear that Acculog could have 
prevented the spread of the fire from the engine of the van to the 
logging equipment had a fire extinguisher been available, but that 
should not have been the question presented to the jury. We are 
not concerned in comparative negligence law with the cause of 
the damage, but with the cause of the injury instead. 
Acculog, 692 P.2d at 730 (emphasis added). To further explain, the court quoted 
from Clark v. Cassetty, 376 P.2d 37 (N.M. 1962): 
The term "injury" is sometimes used in the sense of "damage," as 
including the harm or loss for which compensation is sought, and 
has been defined as damage resulting from an unlawful act; but in 
strict legal significance, there is, properly speaking, a material 
distinction between the two terms, in that injury means something 
done against the right of the party, producing damage, whereas 
damage is the harm, detriment, or loss sustained by reason of the 
injury. 
Clark, 376 P.2d at 38 (emphasis added). There was no comparative negligence, 
since "the proximate, direct and immediate cause of the loss of Acculog's van 
and equipment was a fire which broke out in the engine through no fault of 
Acculog's and spread to the logging unit." Acculog, 692 P.2d at 731. The 
"injury" at question in Acculog was a negligent repair which caused a fire. The 
failure to have a fire extinguisher had nothing to do with that negligent repair 
and could not have "caused" the fire; therefore, it was not "causally connected" 
to the injury. Acculog, 692 P.2d at 730. 
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Steiner cites with approval the case of Matthews v. Williford, 318 
So.2d 480 (Fla. App. 1975). In that case, the defense contended that the 
patient's own conduct, including smoking, chest pains, being overweight, a prior 
heart attack, etc., contributed to his fatal heart attack. It was held that the 
patient's prior conduct could not be considered a proximate cause of his death. 
Id. at 483. The patient's negligence "must have been 'an active and efficient 
contributing cause of the injury.'" Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 
459 N.W.2d 178, 186 (Neb. 1990) (cited in Steiner, supra, at \ 13). 
D. Undisputed Facts Demonstrate the 
Lack of Any Comparative Negligence by Plaintiff, 
The only facts that could possibly be considered by the jury in 
determining comparative negligence of the plaintiff would be actions of plaintiff 
after January 13, 1997, the date of her first visit. What possible facts are there 
in this regard? There are none, when the evidence is reasonably viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict. 
The hallmark of negligence is failure to use reasonable care which 
results in a foreseeable injury. The jury must decide what a prudent person with 
similar knowledge would do in a similar situation. Negligence may arise in 
acting or in failing to act. R. 1073, 1066. To be negligent, Geri Harding must 
obviously have some knowledge of some risk that would make it negligent for 
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her not to act, and this knowledge must occur after treatment begins. See Point 
II.B above. 
A patient certainly has a duty to follow reasonable instructions and 
heed warnings given to the patient by the practitioner undertaking the patient's 
care and treatment. But here, it is uncontested that Dr. Bell gave Geri 
Harding no possible advice or warning that she failed to heed that could 
have caused her heart attack. Facts 7, 8, 9, 11. Dr. Bell told Geri Harding 
that she was "normal," and did not dispute Harding's accounts. See Dr. Bell 
testimony, R. 1417:37:19-38:2. 
Additionally, Geri Harding was given no information at the ETT 
test on 1 /22/97 that could put her on notice that she was at risk. R. 1417:3 7:19-
23. Dr. BelPs testimony on this subject was to the effect that he did not recall 
what he told Geri (T. 3/10/00, p. 22:14-18),9 but that he did not think he told her 
there was any particular emergency. T. 3/10/00, p. 25:19-23. Geri Harding's 
testimony was uncontested that she was told that the test was "normal" and Dr. 
Bell admitted it was possible he told her that. T. 3/10/00, p. 23:2-6, and R. 
1414:93:9-15. He did not prescribe any medications such as aspirin or 
9
 This transcript was prepared because counsel received his copy. Inexplicably, 
however, the original was not numbered and filed, at least as of this writing. It will be 
requested and filed shortly. 
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nitroglycerin. R. 1417:37:24-38:2. There was never any contrary evidence 
introduced from which one could reasonably construe any noncompliance or 
other negligence from this event. In fact, Dr. Bell's deposition testimony was 
read where he admitted that on finding an abnormal ETT test, either Dr. Bell or 
his staff would call a cardiologist. This should be done "expeditiously" 
(facetiously described by Dr. Bell as "the day before you did [the ETT]"). Id. 
at 26:15-27:13. He reaffirmed at trial that it was his duty, the standard of care, 
"to expeditiously go about arranging the cardiac consultation." Id. at 41:24-5; 
42:22-24. This should be done "within a matter hours." M a t 43:9,13. When 
you get the ETT results in front of you, "you do it then." Id. at 44:8. 
Geri Harding next hears from Dr. Bell's office later in the day on 
the 22nd of January, or on the 23rd, via a routine voice mail on her phone which 
informs her that Dr. Bell's office has made an appointment for her to see a 
cardiologist. R. 1414:95:9-20. There is no indication in the record of any 
warning of emergency, or noncompliance. The appointment was set by Dr. 
Bell's office for two weeks away, and Geri Harding had nothing to do with 
setting that appointment. R. 1414:98:8-14. The evidence on this is uncontested. 
R. 1414:95:12-96:23. Dr. Bell admits the standard of care is to set the 
appointment with the cardiologist for within 1-2 days of receiving the abnormal 
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ETT. R. 1417:50:2-51:6. As a matter of law, this could not be the basis for 
negligence by Geri Harding, since Ms. Harding did not schedule the 
appointment. 
E. No Ignoring of Cardiac Condition on January 24-26, 
The only other possible comparative fault is the alleged ignoring 
of chest pains two days before her heart attack. Defendant relies on the initial 
chart note of Dr. Douglas Smith, the cardiologist, who wrote on Monday, 
January 27th, the day after the heart attack: 
For the last two days she has had recurrent mild chest pain with 
exertion. Yesterday she had an episode of malaise and tiredness 
and experienced severe exertional chest discomfort. 
Trial Exhibit 13, p. 1 (emphasis added). Viewed in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, Dr. Smith is saying that on January 25th and 26th, possibly January 24th 
("for the last two days"), she has had "mild chest pain, malaise and discomfort." 
No where does he purport to say that Geri Harding ignored frank cardiac 
symptoms before the heart attack of January 26th. As a matter of law, it cannot 
have been negligence for Geraldine Harding not to have gone to the doctor the 
day of her heart attack, i.e., January 26th, because she did go. R. 1415:67:15-
68:10. 
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The events of January 24th and 25th cannot have been negligence 
because there is no indication that Geri Harding had any warning or other reason 
to think that she was at risk. It is uncontested that through the January 22nd 
visit, Dr. Bell consistently told her she had no heart problem.10 See Fact 7 and 
R. 1413:23:6-23; Fact 8. All the evidence supports this conclusion. If these 
pains were experienced then, on January 25, the day before the attack, she is just 
three days past a stress EKG (ETT), which should screen for heart problems, and 
she is told the test is normal. Ms. Harding was entitled to rely on her doctor, and 
cannot be negligent for doing so. 
Dr. Smith then noted that on Sunday, January 26, she developed a 
"sudden onset of chest pain,. . . [which] was very severe and has lasted several 
hours. It began about 1 p.m. . . . [and] she started to go to the hospital.'5 Trial 
Exhibit 13, p. 1. Thus when the pain became severe, Harding went to the 
hospital. There was no ignoring severe chest pain or a heart attack. In context, 
it is most significant that Dr. Bell had given her no warning or clue that she had 
a cardiac condition, even after the truck stop incident of severe pain. So there 
is absolutely no reason for Geri Harding to believe her January 24th or 25th 
discomfort was anything more than indigestion. It might legally be considered 
10
 Dr. Bell indicated that concerns about a possible cardiac condition were the 
reason for the EKG and for scheduling the ETT. R. 1413:42:18-43:10. 
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negligence if Dr. Bell had warned her, "Go to the hospital right away if you have 
any more chest pain/5 or something similar, but absent such a warning how can 
it be considered the "failure to use reasonable care" by Ms. Harding? There was 
no reason for her to think that she was at risk. 
Two other crucial doctrines come in to play, the duty to warn and 
the right to rely on the doctor, and the court instructed the jury on both of these. 
R. 1066,1068. A physician clearly has a duty to warn the patient how to avoid 
injury following treatment. Mikkelsen v. Haslam, 764 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 
1988). Mikkelsen had sought treatment of an orthopedic condition from Dr. 
Haslam, and was informed by him that the condition would not prevent him 
from skiing. Mikkelsen went skiing, suffered further injury, and sued Dr. 
Haslam. The court held that it was not negligent for Mikkelsen to have gone 
skiing because Dr. Haslam failed to warn him of any particular problems that 
could result. Mikkelsen, 764, P.2d at 1384. We have the same thing here. 
Undisputedly, there were no warnings to Geraldine Harding that could have 
provided her the knowledge that her "mild recurrent chest pains" two days 
before her heart attack were something she should worry about. Furthermore, 
the doctor/patient relationship "permits a patient to rely on a doctor's 
professional skill and advice," and the patient is not required to determine 
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whether that advice is correct. Id. There is no evidence to indicate that Geri 
Harding was not relying on Dr. Bell's advice throughout the entire course of 
treatment. Dr. Bell does not claim the contrary. 
In the final analysis, any comparative negligence must amount to 
some fact that Geri Harding should have known about, and then ignored, 
that would have subjected her to the risk of a heart attack. That is the potential 
injury for which Dr. Bell should have been treating her. Therefore, if Geri 
Harding ran a stop sign on her way to see Dr. Bell, it would be negligent but not 
a basis for comparison. Likewise, Geri Harding's alleged ignoring of mild chest 
pain and chest discomfort, under the circumstances of this case, could not 
possibly be compared to Dr. Bell's failure to diagnose the dangerous condition 
of unstable angina, because it is exactly that failure that prevented Geri Harding 
from knowing that she was at risk. How can one compare that egregious 
negligence with Geri Harding's ignorance, which ignorance was induced by Dr. 
Bell's negligent treatment? The Court can surely see the "Catch-22" situation 
here. Dr. Bell's negligence prevented Geri Harding from knowing that she was 
at risk, yet Dr. Bell wants to use that doctor-induced ignorance to reduce his 
responsibility in this case. It should not be allowed to happen. 
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This case is much like Kistlerv.Halsey, 481 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1971), 
where the jury ignored undisputed medical evidence showing that the plaintiff 
suffered painful injuries. The court stated that the verdict: 
. . . was not a true verdict rendered according to the law and the 
evidence as required by the jurors' oath of office. The jury failed 
in its function in this respect by refusing to recognize the 
undisputed facts concerning plaintiffs injuries and to award him 
compensatory damages to which he was entitled. Under these 
circumstances a new trial on the issue of damages only is 
warranted. 
Id at 724. This court should reverse, and order a new trial only on the issue of 
damages. 
POINT III 
- Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict is Appropriate -
A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT IS 
AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY IN THIS CASE BECAUSE 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT, VIEWING THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO DR. BELL. 
A. Legal Standard for J.N.O.V. 
Rule 59(a)(6) and (7) provide that a new trial may be granted on 
part or all of the issues if the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict, or if 
there is an error in law. Rule 59(e) provides that a judgment may be altered or 
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amended, and Rule 60(b)(7) provides for relief from the operation of a judgment 
upon a good cause showing. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently affirmed the basis in Utah for 
aj.n.o.v.: 
Turning to the standard of review, we reverse a trial court's denial 
of a motion for aj.n.o.v. based on insufficient evidence to support 
the verdict only if, "viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed, we conclude that the evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict." 
Hall v. Wal-Mart Inc., 959 P.2d 109, 111 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). The 
Supreme Court has also stated, "In passing on a motion for aj.n.o.v.,... a trial 
court has no latitude and must be correct." Braithwaite v. West Valley City 
Corp., 921 P.2d 997,999 (Utah 1996), quoting Crookson v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 
P.2d 799, 799 (Utah 1991). The court must look at all reasonable inferences in 
a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and then find that there is no 
competent evidence to support the verdict. Braithwaite, 921 P.2d at 999. The 
motion should be granted if "reasonable persons" could not reach differing 
conclusions on the issue. Id. 
The verdict in this case was nothing less than astounding. There 
was pervasive evidence of the defendant's negligence. There is not even a 
scintilla of evidence of Geri Harding's negligence, yet she was found to have 
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been 55% responsible. Even if this Court finds that there is a basis for some 
negligence, there is no way it could be that much, based upon the undisputed 
evidence. The trial court should have exercised its responsibility here and 
overturned this verdict. It was error not to do so. 
A few years ago, a very similar case came before the Court of 
Appeals. In Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing, Inc., 797 P.2d 725 (Utah App. 1990), 
plaintiff was driving north on 900 East at or below the posted speed limit of 45 
mph. As plaintiff approached the intersection of 900 East and Fort Union Blvd., 
defendant, intending to go west, exited a shopping center on the southeast corner 
of the intersection, drove northwest, perpendicularly, across the northbound 
lanes of 900 East, and entered plaintiffs lane of traffic, causing the collision. 
Defendant argued that there was enough evidence to support plaintiffs 
contributory negligence because it was a busy day and plaintiff allegedly should 
have slowed down in approaching the intersection. The court reversed the 
submission of plaintiff s negligence to the jury: 
We have reviewed the evidence marshaled by plaintiff and agree 
that it cannot support a finding that plaintiff was partially 
negligent. There is no dispute that plaintiff was traveling in his 
own lane of traffic at or near the speed limit before the accident. 
. . . [T]here is no evidence indicating that plaintiff drove faster 
than was reasonable and prudent, or that the speed was unsafe and 
inappropriate, or that the road or weather conditions necessitated 
a lower speed. Nor was there evidence of special hazards or unsafe 
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driver behavior. The only evidence that was offered to suggest that 
plaintiff was negligent was the testimony of one of the defense 
experts who was "concerned" that plaintiffs car was still moving 
at the speed limit "that close to an intersection." In short, we could 
find no substantial evidence that would support a reduction in 
damages for plaintiffs negligence. Accordingly, we reverse the 
special verdict attributing 25% of the total negligence to plaintiff. 
Id. at 529. 
In this case, the evidence would have justified a verdict of 
$200,000. Plaintiff requests that the Court order the j .n.o. v. and grant judgment 
to plaintiff in that amount. In the alternative, the judgment should find 100% 
negligence against the defendant and award a new trial on the issue of damages 
only. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff spent hundreds of hours and tens of thousands of dollars 
preparing and trying this case. She was entitled to a fair jury, and not one tinged 
with bias. This was a conservative venire to begin with, since many had strong 
views favoring limitations on medical malpractice suits and pain and suffering 
damages. Therefore, it was crucial for plaintiff to exercise her peremptory 
challenges in such a way as to make the panel more fair. Accordingly, it was 
prejudicial error for the court to refuse to strike the three challenged jurors for 
cause, due to bias. Each of the three had a relationship with Dr. Bell, or his 
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chief expert witness, that would make it very difficult for the juror to fairly 
evaluate the case. 
Additionally, there was clearly insufficient evidence for the jury to 
consider plaintiffs comparative negligence. When the evidence is viewed in a 
light most favorable to the verdict, it is still clear that there was no evidence of 
plaintiffs alleged negligence because she was told at each meeting with Dr. Bell 
that she was normal and had no heart problem. She was entitled to follow her 
doctor's advice in this regard, and was not required to distrust or challenge him. 
She was never told by Dr. Bell that she had any risk for a heart attack, and was 
not given any warnings or medications. Plaintiff had no reason to think she was 
at risk for a cardiac event, and her ignorance was due to the affirmative advice 
and diagnosis rendered by Dr. Bell, himself. Accordingly, this Court should 
find that there was insufficient evidence to find plaintiff contributorily 
negligent. 
The verdict should be overturned and the parties ordered to proceed 
to trial on the issue of damages only. 
Dated this 31 st day of July, 2001. 
ROBERT B.SYKES 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
1. Trial Exhibit 2 - Dr. Bell's Chart Note 
2. Selected Jury Questionnaire Excerpts, pages 2, 3 and 4 only, R. 1423. 
Juror No. 1 - Jacob Ross 
Juror No. 2 - Sue Sanft 
Juror No. 3 - Rocky Baker 
Juror No. 5 - Natilie Thompson 
Juror No. 7 - Heather S. Vance 
Juror No. 13 - Carol Ellsworth 
Juror No. 16 - Martine Mahoney Hales 
Juror No. 19 - Lynn Maughan 
Juror No. 21 - Jeremy Wade Killpack 
Juror No. 22 - Lynne H. Adamson 
Juror No. 25 - Michele Thueson Kimmel 
Q:\WP5l\CLffiNTM595\P\Appeal\Briefto Supreme Court.wpd 
Tabl 
DR. BELL'S PROGRESS NOTES: 
1-13-97 
WT: 171 
BP: 130/70 
36415 
SMA 
CBC 
TSH 
CKMB 
99213 
EKG 
Thyroid check, left arm went numb, dizzy. 
S: Two weeks ago at a truck stop experienced sudden 
nausea. Approximately two minutes later got dizzy & 
really sick feeling, with diaphoresis [sweating] & severe 
sternal pressure "like bricks on her chest." Went to car & 
took off shirt, jewelry, etc. Symptoms subsided after 
approximately 30 minutes, except left shoulder & arm 
stayed numb for approximately one hour. Thereafter felt 
fine, without weakness or other symptoms. Doesn't recall 
any shortness of breath. 
O [Objective Signs]: 
CBC - Normal 
SMA - Normal 
CK-<20 
EKG - Normal 
Cardiac - Normal 
Lungs - Normal 
Abdomen - Normal 
A [Assessment]: Transient chest pain 
P [Plan]: Exercise Treadmill Test 
1-14-97 Took EKG report to Dr. Welch. 
1-15-97 Thyroid Stimulating Hormone: Less Than 0.07 
Triglycerides: 212 
Cholesterol: 222 
Plan: Is she on Synthroid medication? 
1-22-97 Exercise Treadmill Test: Positive 
Referred to Cardiology 
Appt. with Dr. Asay Wed. Feb. 5th 2:30 p.m. VN [Vivian 
Nelson] 
Tab 2 
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Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES »y . NO . If yes, please explain: 
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Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
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answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: ^ W ^ /?«. /US (Print) 
/ — 
Place of birth: S^,* ts+*L Age: 3$ 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.) ^j^sr Lx.ui 
In what other cities or states have you lived: /r-iC^ , dn^*' , S**U t-'*ti Z U 
Marital Status: st^cy* *d 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) & $rt*M~ 
Your Occupation: Zo^-bct rt>s No. of Years ^ ^ 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: / W J \ ^r'sUinj*/
 t 
What jobs have you held in the past: £&r,o^ K&r O^h ^/* " ^r 
Spouse's Occupation: ttpr^Lj^di^ No. of Years ?Q 
n 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children ^ <^^^J^ 
St / 7 ^ o ^ i f v . MS £c£*d M O , A1 // , *1 B . A ? . At ¥ . f t , M ***M+L 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? //0%\*~ 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES NO ,X . If no, please 
explain why: Oi^L. *'f J>H> ^IA^S S&Lf>'<h^ o ^ /**. uj*rhU.J &%>Ct 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES yK . NO . If yes, please explain: <*&*>*. *J*A*~ /^*L#~, S(AT^< 
^ 7 ' 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES NO X . If yes, 
please explain why: 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES ^ . NO . Briefly explain your answer: &<> IQK^ &>% fp% ^4wf 
£)C-t 
4 
C~-*^v*'c<?\^ &\.\^s.-'&*%/ 
t 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? ^ Y £>6\k\ b-*-• &*\-i /nos+hs X ^ t . t / .*H~K i CA^C &rt s<ji&4,^s*k 
far aw &t*jn k^*Jm 
7 mf. 
/ 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: 
Place of birth: "FvWD , I f T Age: 2 3 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.). 
In what other cities or states have you lived: 
Marital Status: \AAAWlffL 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) ^OWrf f ! ( )Hf^ 
Your Occupation: V\f)WKYWAfcf No. of Years " V 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: Vffi )U, C/LYf (n 
What jobs have you held in the past: ^/TV-frfa W|, fc\£ h\? i ^AWspfVft f f t 
Spouse's Occupation: V\i/Akr Op-fTflfeY* No. of Years A 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children 
.Fvr (3) \prrxj [Hrnte) 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? ^pov\s \\\u^T^rA^
 t k\fwcp^ptyr 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
Y E S ^ L NO . If yes, please explain: Nl-f& \ Y)(\\i\/-( fHfAj 
^YvS\K\k s\K^ c C\A <V\tt\0\V\ fa Y^IKKX 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES x NO . If yes, 
please explain why: \ ^ \ h \ ^ \$ 4VW ttflVttfly*; CAlA h±l 
_ _ .
 a 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES X . NO X • Briefly explain your answer: fi^ \fir\(7\ flSs 
\\ Vs noV CL& o\Ar(A(Xf,o\\s ^ u , m 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? T w f r ^ fly Wvwin ar\ik mow m \ c ^ A l ^ ^ 
\A \\t - \ Y U S An coYYYrA \V. <V\oA ^\av\<L 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? Lean he is aoingsometning wrong. What do you reel abo 
<k\rt 
r FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: ///>rr^er S, W^ce (Print) 
Place of birth: Murray , (Jl&k Age: ^S 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.) A/or+hnefd', rleaSani~ fyifovt-
In what other cities or states have you lived: Hifirlfana, vJr/irii&x/frtfl S^inaenirtOihrSaJf^^. 
Marital Status: fAd rrtra 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) //•£, 6tfadj JOWL &l'Cf£-
Your Occupation: lull Jin* /ime/m&r No. of Years 5 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: Zlf^s £Y /?<-/}</Ma/of-ato A&tce. 
What jobs have you held in the past: T^idu ik&fj j-lr^i fic/l/isfr,'A/annaj UtnfaJ ft&<Sfed~~ 
Spouse's Occupation: ken Jkcjoport /4a/lCiQ£r No. of Years ui 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? ~~Tk/ UO/LJ hl&sa/s/ 7H^ n Q. tf2W(6c«J {//& a asides — A/a//. 
^ y y ^ ^ r r ( K M /hfdw L/fcj ^(urCJ'' /r\$(p\,&&/&%<?*£) 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES \ NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES V" . NO . If yes, please explain: ~C belief*- "fm.-f- ff~ zhAuJd be 
fL of-Feci- en rld.i'L li-fcy Li nnh /f toffs<>Mt/i+ frct^r-. (t/tl(rx//Mnmh^. 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES NO^T . If yes, 
please explain why: 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an ^ appropriate case? 
YES_ . NO X - Briefly explain your answer: Jk//l andSi/{4c>i/ti OCfft rs In 
f.Vkr,A /?<;psrf nf life. ^  /f is iaeur^dk ,H~fea<r ik/xi -fori oftn /+• 
istyffrsYrnjx -fa allow tit ~b &J- aJhif-fjf. L/rmt,nnf~cJiaf /AMm>J„ 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this?.7Ti£w -fji/rh sirrers OCCtir, ftfiprfiJ/g} not- nn fa br< ; flzst. IKJ-
fhOr-c ben* us/ />£ UnZa>.n farhrvc. A1 tfktoof.;.TV/£ tfrfajiiaf- -Huty <%* 
i do Orr(tr' "h fl$/rf/&*.(*. or fa/wanGr-an tinui/fifm/ss. ~h Jz &$* 
prcpcw?d. (J <f J 0 ^ 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
ZT u/nuJaf a&r-ss , ITT 4hlnt. Sfime Dr<. <t.tr< i/c^c, sffrrsssti/e. //? /de&(in*. 
kJiti a UtaJil f'szotf./ nfljL-rc -hra ~h -fird am Of!p/z>&rJi, thzJ- /S 
In/7 JD th "Hu, Joesf ifr'fhciV 
4 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, j 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., j 
Defendant. ] 
) CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
) QUESTIONNAIRE 
) Civil No. 970400939MP 
) Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: OAEJIL f*./.{-<=,<*intdhfa (Print) 
Place of birth: S x f t ^ r c L An?.. Age: 70 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.) Oc^/liinal OrC/V\ 
In what other cities or states have you lived: 4yt\\J/) (J-h -rlvfr-h DL f\rrz . CX/trStas 
fr Ccjl'wi^ % RocL^y font; Cofa> W ^ 
Marital Status: *Z/ns,/e 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) £k &£- £<L 
Your Occupation: 1<Zqc\\QV ^ drtle SufP.fC- No. of Years f3 Ylfa) f^fi r<3cL 
1
 04 . ' 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: 7 ^ 7 ^ / / / ^ ^ . C^f^r-lf^s 
What jobs have you held in the past:. 
Spouse's Occupation: fc/fi No. of Years 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children 
iU 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? pg^/z^H/^a^ - ({^hdnaK^oa. Tfrsfdrrz O^c^h - Q)s 
pernio r\\\\i 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES NO . If no, please 
explain why: VapdJ^^ n0 *fh<?< C^ 3<£ $ SiJM ^lotf* ~~ 
Ho for &<zUcjiw&—Cjr&/iiflfl<L Swg ' 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES A-. NO . If yes, please explain: 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES )Z. NO . If yes, 
please explain why: Z (Wdfi <%(b?fd-)nrt T^&fctCfj l/e> 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES . NO . Briefly explain your answer: -flAiL dLjA&y^ €lf4*< 
Question No, 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? ~T~<Anim-h^Ai^A, /rrno. /o-W ^ynJuJ^O^A^A^,^ A+B We_ 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
4 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: MfltW, MahCYIlLj fffllgs (Print) 
Place of birth: LOCjOn , U+fl^ Age: _J±3 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.). 
In what other cities or states have you lived: 5ondU SflH" Liftk-t CfTll TfonS, ft* 
Marital Status: \j\Cm\td Evayv? ton
 t Wv(t>w*A 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) pee*- Qpvuki ^ , M <s^^rtr s 
Your Occupation: Sdu ca^^ No. of Years 13 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: IX" -frtfldo S^1 Q^d 
qfK c^fartt -Trench Cmd €nghstv 
What jobs have you held in the past: T. Wtfki>d CK^> g motHoc^ ScfCrg-fetru 
ano! -E^cwh^ /*&>*&)•Qnt~ -io z bank: Vice P r ^ s i ^ e ^ ^ -
Spouse's Occupation: C wit £y\Qn ^ eeHfbhrfrmcftrNo. of Years ^ 0 
Hease U , * e f n d e I , age and o c ^ l , eacK of y 0 U r ^ _M^J^^ 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? M&ofeutegfc
 ? •ft;, fekt Eflpp<an, gnflUs'U Joamal, P<rftp[f; 
"TWel f-bll day
 ; ^tfi ""ibckij . Ua^Dml Gr^ qm-fiivC . 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES '-""""'NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES S. NO . If yes, please explain: IT Js^l^v-f \\>np& Uftv& <x\PtwdM 
fha+ ck;cter^ should b-e r^pohiblf, bu4- not so v^rea I a n 
3Urh 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES NO \S. If yes, 
please explain why: 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES y/. NO . Briefly explain your answer: %IL q^OA^l m e n ^ u 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? *s Jxfau*, jkPTfl am giW fiente % i y ^ p \ ^ t t ( ^ t ^ j ^ ^ ^ g o 
djt&fabO jiyjv (MoJl (M* tf^rn QUO U&rf i^f/ CCor^ , J,lto£oLfa&& CLn^A 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the
 / rL t^S!^ ' &JA 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not p^bM^a-iu^j 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
dn^ntuayno. ^'i^t Jia-^ci yfrW^ jftlb cUtu/- KcnsO H^ kec^c 
tn \/rtrUd ktvo* J^coo^oUe^ a coat cdUfcus*#2y tf^z^n *te*f 
»7 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: ka\J*J U\AUC,IA^^ (Print) 
Place of birth: (Atf*/{•>*/ Wf~«<^ Age: H Y 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.) ~? /?\***iC/> 
In what other cities or states have you lived: 
Marital Status: 'P 
t/ 
. . . 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) H(4 ( ) c Lao 
Your Occupation: '/-VHi p r^/^t^-K. No. of Years ^ ( 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: C/)AJ 57^lf Cft <?•</ Pu^^\UljdK, 
What jobs have you held in the past: 
Spouse's Occupation: MJSKVL \^*AM^ No. of Years 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? **), <? 1/ ^ ^ ^ ^ c A J i ^ / (J 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES NO, ,-1 . If no, please 
explain why: lAoU < u74~< <7*J o<x-T d^i &^Jr*j/^ 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES j £ . NO . If yes, please explain:
 j / ^ v / ^ ^ f Q ^ T ^ b ^ f> 
M]*} k 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES A NO . If yes, 
please explain why: HAA ~J ~\ \ \\M ( ? 4 o( <*- $ (AJ &<*r^ £kx(g -i^a^M-
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES . NO V _ . Briefly explain your answer: 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doator was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? AhiuWo r*> xJai- QA/ ^KAJ~ ^<C 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? , 
^ + *E £_ 
4 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. I: Please provide the following information: 
Name: 3PXV.WVJ lAuk KHlftiifr (Print) 
Place of birth: Vnyjc ^T Age: Jll 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.) AJCS-HA CktM 
In what other cities or states have you lived: SpnWi^ilk 
Marital Status: /mrrioj 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) HLL Qb&o/ 
Your Occupation: (A4* hf/rfl&mjev'' No. of Years 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: ( AAS4MAJ^ Ss^iwCe, 
What jobs have you held in the past: Ca+Lyir. yjiat/iaa&rj rtfaifJbz&i* X^/uo^L/. 
Spouse's Occupation: Z ^ /\Q*rz/JLry/fateful 4- No. of Years / 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children J& 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? & 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES V NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES j ^ . NO . If yes, please explain: OUA^< *£fc,„ er^yri.n ^ . Pexpl*. 
&*JL g t Q4Hr.**r¥^ J^ ^J-KOJ^ 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES NO ^v . If yes, 
please explain why: 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES K . NO . Briefly explain your answer: /2tJ« ^ w / SLJ^^ ^ *e 
AUJU <&itL W *rS*$U*lfj " , 7&L/teA>*** <?Ai,/aL/Je *Ah>/ ^ m s - e * u * / *n**^ &<^<-& 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this?£n*csfa*< > -*&' ^£ ub*4ri A^/e##u£&
 cr
 K
*&u4 *ua*7* &*** s S4^L/ 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
g /Tk/lAJ *H&sd«\<C<P fWhUmfr **Z>r **** S ^ . h?*e/. yin tote/ ^u^pjS^jJ1 
4 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions •folly and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: Lj^nc. H» n a a v v v S ^ (Print) 
Place of birth: Salf Ukt- QiU ld~ Age: 67 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.). 
In what other cities or states have you lived:. 
Marital Status: 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) Hlw \C-t\oo I 
Your Occupation: /?g,f / %LStnesS No. of Years. 
0 ff It e. 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: rjospn<v^ hillll/lQ 
Jul d\ef\ Ca I (XiiT i es 
What jobs have you held in the past: Pff vtnt I h-s- s / STcf Ylr . 
^pous^s-Occupation: Lon^r Plldr/fl A No. of Years / -
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children 
SUx**. Al Q H<l) (Vt-U ^ fcft/9) tydLAy ^ (4<H«jL^iL*SJ 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? C V U L X ^ T ^ 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES X NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
YES Y . NO . If yes, please explain: 
S>omt one e Lse's l h S t c ^ a wg <e ^ 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES V NO . If yes, 
please explain why: 
77 yvu-nM^ awaras q r £ \&r 
-7lM etn 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES _ ) v NO . Briefly explain your answer: 
Question No. 7: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? No k^oiA/XtAa ^ 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
A 
% 
r c £--
4 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GERALDINE KAY HARDING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CARL T. BELL, M.D., 
Defendant. 
CONFIDENTIAL JUROR 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Civil No. 970400939MP 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
This court and the attorneys appreciate your involvement in the civil 
justice system. Please answer the following questions fully and to the best of your 
ability. Make any additional comments that you feel would help clarify your 
answers. Your completed questionnaire will be distributed only to the Court and the 
attorneys for the parties, and will be used by them only in connection with this case. 
PLEASE PRINT 
Question No. 1: Please provide the following information: 
Name: ^ C h ^ V ^ K\fWYY-C\ rmdcft YYUftTC. ~Jhl l£Sbn (Print) 
Place of birth: K \ \ n r y h \ T Age: 2ff 
Neighborhood (e.g. East Provo, North Orem, etc.). 
In what other cities or states have you lived: VVOv/0. f^Vxr>\SV\ rTvrK ^ A x V t e i 
Marital Status: m ^ M M^OXYK 
Highest Level of Education (High School, College, etc.) 
Your Occupation: ki^mifU^rtVWf, A ^ t . No. of Years % 
2 
Describe your employment duties and responsibilities: i)[W^Qf^\ Q(YR^flf\ 
What jobs have you held in the past: SC(XZ\tk\T\ I 
Spouse's Occupation: SD\eS (Y)fAr)Or\fr No. of Years _ J 
Please list the gender, age and occupation for each of your children innate; 2 , ' k 
Question No. 2: What publications do you subscribe to at home or 
work? f^sss C^avOn Yr^aaa-zmcki /VfWm\sYrf,vhvi^ AssV 
Question No. 3: Do you believe that a lawsuit is an appropriate way to 
resolve a dispute concerning a party's compensation for injuries suffered as a result of 
medical malpractice (i.e. negligent medical care)? YES ^ NO . If no, please 
explain why: 
Question No. 4: Do you believe that there should be limits on the 
rights of a person to sue for monetary damages as a result of medical malpractice? 
Y E S X - - NO . If yes, please explain: X V ) g l l ^ itlOX SA^OlAA 
3 
Question No. 5: Would you have difficulty awarding a substantial 
amount of money in a medical malpractice case if the evidence presented at trial 
shows that someone has suffered substantial damages? YES NO )L. If yes, 
please explain why: 
Question No. 6: One type of damage that you may be asked to 
consider in this case is known as "pain and suffering." This is a form of intangible 
damage that cannot be precisely measured and is generally considered to be damage 
for both physical and mental pain, discomfort and suffering, as well as being 
prevented from pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as one previously enjoyed. Do 
you believe that it is fair to award such damages in an appropriate case? 
YES X . NO . Briefly explain your answer: \1 V>t\\(\^ CTAlA CL 
"finryiW amnymV fjac^ uid \nc rmarked m ^ c h a, case, 
Question NoVv: Some people think that a bad medical result must 
mean that a doctor was negligent or did something wrong. What do you feel about 
this? K\q^  q\wM^ rprop rnerticftl practices affcet-
^ r r t o \r\ (\Hfctfflc i^mnp. XM^ at us apod W 
fYYXvA nHr hf, opori -fnr a\\. 
Question No. 8: Doctors may have different ways of handling the 
same medical problem. The fact that one doctor does things differently does not 
necessarily mean he is doing something wrong. What do you feel about this? 
"X OOxtf. , Annn^x^fldr \S npoA fry ^ e , ^ rw 
V>oV V& oped W <\W b x t o r ^ ^fooiM ws-f > ffiM 
^(VyoofnA- MNjncn -irtrchnfl fifthonfo, 
4 
